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The number of gasoline stations in Canada fell by 40 percent between 1989 and 2000.  Many 
demand and competition related explanations have been offered for this rationalization, while 
industry sources cite stiffer environmental regulations as a factor in station closures.  In the late 
1980s and early 1990s most Canadian provinces adopted regulations requiring that unprotected 
petroleum storage tanks be upgraded or replaced according to a schedule based on the age of the 
tank and that nearby unprotected tanks also be upgraded or removed.  In this paper, we exploit 
provincial differences in the timing of these regulations to examine the role of upgrade and 
removal regulations on the timing and degree of station shutdown in 12 cities across the country.  
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I.  Introduction 
 
Over the 1990s, the Canadian retail gasoline industry went through a period of dramatic 
rationalization, with the number of gasoline stations in Canada falling by approximately 40 
percent from 1989 to 2000.
 1  Similar overall trends have been observed elsewhere; see Scherer 
(1996) for a discussion of rationalization in the U.S. in the 1970s, and Gotz and Gugler (2006) 
for some discussion of Austria and Germany. Many explanations have been offered as to why 
and how the Canadian industry rationalized.
2  The Conference Board of Canada (2001) discusses 
the effect of independent stations not associated with refiners, changes in demand for gasoline 
and repair services, and changes in land values.  Carranza et al (2010) examine the impact of a 
price floor in Quebec on the evolution of the industry, while Eckert and West (2006) consider the 
role that new entry played on rationalization in the Vancouver area. Eckert and West (2005) 
consider whether the process of rationalization was consistent with tacit collusion. Industry 
sources and media reports suggest that environmental regulations may have contributed to retail 
closures.  For example, Curran (1994) states that “downsizing was necessary … continual price 
wars due to oversaturation and costlier environmental regulations conspired to force retailers 
hands.”  The Report of the Liberal Committee on Gasoline Pricing In Canada (1988) included in 
the list of obstacles to financing independent business “mandated environmental investments that 
are unrecoverable through pump price.”  However,  the role of environmental regulations in 
Canadian rationalization has not been the subject of any formal analysis. 
 Leaks from underground petroleum storage tanks, including those at gasoline stations, 
pose a threat to groundwater, with one litre of gasoline having the potential to contaminate 
                                                           
1 See Conference Board of Canada (2001). 
2 The impact of rationalization in Canada on price and market structure is considered by Sen and Townley (2010). 3 
 
1 000 000 litres of groundwater.
3  Groundwater is the source of drinking water for approximately 
10 million Canadians, and is important for agriculture, industrial processes, and the hydrological 
cycle.
4 The number of leaking USTs increased during the 1970s and 1980s.  By 1987 there were 
an estimated 7500 to 20000 leaking USTs in Canada, representing up to 10% of total tanks 
(Environment Canada 1987).  The cause of this increase was the aging of the stock of steel tanks 
with no corrosion protection.
5  In response, federal and provincial governments began regulating 
or issuing guidelines for underground petroleum storage. 
This paper uses annual data on the closure of retail stations in 12 cities across Canada to 
examine the association between changes in environmental regulations governing petroleum 
storage and the timing and degree of station closures between 1986 and 2006.  The 
rationalization of stations coincided with a significant change to regulations regarding corrosion 
protection for underground storage tanks.  Prior to the late 1980s, provinces required all newly 
installed tanks to meet corrosion protection standards but made no requirements regarding 
corrosion protection of existing unprotected tanks, which were the most likely to corrode.  
Between 1987 and 2001 most provinces adopted new regulations that required existing tanks to 
be either upgraded or replaced.  These regulations represented an increase in the fixed costs of 
maintaining a gasoline station that had unprotected tanks.
6  In fact, a number of news reports 
regarding the closure of individual stations suggest that upgrading and replacing tanks was 
prohibitively expensive.  Regarding the closure of a station in Uranium City, SK, Braden (1997) 
states “Imperial Oil is leaving because it’s too expensive to dig up its underground storage tanks 
and replace them … to comply with new provincial environmental laws.”   All else equal, it is 
                                                           
3See http://www.ec.gc.ca/water/en/manage/poll/e_tanks.htm,  last accessed May 9, 2008. 
4 See Government of Canada (2003). 
5 http://www.ec.gc.ca/water/en/manage/poll/e_tanks.htm,  last accessed May 9, 2008. 
6 For example, Prentice (1995) reports that “retailers will also have to carry the costs of higher environmental 
standards, which could mean capital costs of more than $150,000 for every gas station.”   4 
 
expected that shutdown rates will be higher in cities facing these regulations, in years containing 
or immediately preceding the deadlines for removal or upgrade. 
Our paper contributes to the rationalization literature and to the literature on industry 
evolution by being the first to consider the role of environmental regulations in Canadian 
rationalization.
7  As well, understanding the factors contributing to the nature of rationalization is 
important for the formulation of policy.  This study also contributes to the literature examining 
whether environmental regulations change closure decisions of firms.  A number of theoretical 
studies have shown that environmental regulations can alter location choices of firms, but the 
associated empirical work is limited and has produced mixed results.
8   Biorn et al (1998) finds 
that Norwegian manufacturing plants faced with environmental regulations are less likely to exit 
than others, while  List et al (2004) conclude that New Source Review requirements under the 
Clean Air Act did not have an economically important effect on closure decisions.   
To our knowledge, the only other study to link environmental regulations and gasoline 
station closure is Yin et al (2007) that examines rationalization in Michigan. The authors find 
that because of liquidity constraints, small retailers were more likely to exit than large retailers 
when faced with expensive environmental regulations.  Our study differs from Yin et al. (2007) 
in two ways.  First, rather than examine station level decisions within a single jurisdiction, we 
examine closure rates across jurisdictions with different environmental regulations, allowing us 
to identify the effect of the regulations by the provincial variation of the timing of similar 
regulations.  Second, their study examines which types of stations are more likely to close 
following regulations whereas ours focuses on the question of whether UST regulations in fact 
                                                           
7 The empirical literature on entry and exit is extensive. See Siegried and Evans (1994) and Berry and Reiss (2007) 
for surveys. 
8 See Copeland and Taylor (2006) for a discussion of the pollution haven hypothesis and related empirical work, 
Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) for a review of empirical studies of environmental regulations and firm location , 
and Stafford (1985) for a representative survey based study. 5 
 
increased closure rates. 
To anticipate results, we find evidence that closure rates did respond to upgrade and 
removal regulations.  In particular, closure rates are higher in cities and periods in which stations 
face an impending deadline for upgrade and removal of unprotected tanks than in the same city 
when such a deadline is not in place and in cities for which stations do not face such a deadline.   
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 outlines the provincial petroleum storage 
regulations faced by gasoline station operators.  Section 3 discusses the data. An econometric 
model of the city level closure rate is developed in section 4, and regression results are presented 
in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
 
II.  Environmental Regulations 
 
Historically, the primary concern relating to the storage of petroleum products was the 
fire hazard they posed.  As such, underground storage was preferred to aboveground storage.  
During the 1970s and 1980s, the environmental threat posed by leaking underground storage 
tanks became clear.  Regulators in Canada and elsewhere began regulating underground storage 
tanks in order to reduce the probability and extent of leaks.  In Canada, environmental 
regulations governing petroleum storage are under provincial jurisdiction unless the storage takes 
place on federally owned property.  Provincial regulations included construction standards, 
monitoring requirements, procedures to be followed when closing a site, and corrosion protection 
standards.
 We focus on corrosion protection requirements for two reasons: corroding tanks and 
piping are the leading cause of leaks, and such regulations were the only ones to our knowledge 
to undergo a systematic change during the period of rationalization.   6 
 
Prior to the late 1980s, corrosion protection regulations in most provinces required all 
new underground petroleum storage tanks conform to the latest edition of the relevant 
Underwriters’ Laboratories of Canada standards (S603.1 or S603 for steel tanks and C58A for 
fiberglass tanks).
 9 These regulations did not require changes to existing storage systems.  As 
older unprotected tanks continued to corrode, the problem of petroleum leaks remained.   
 Beginning in the late 1980s,  most provinces adopted regulations requiring petroleum 
storage facilities to upgrade or replace unprotected tanks, typically according to a schedule based 
on the age of the tank.  In 1988, the Canadian Council of Resource and Environment Ministers 
(CCREM) published environmental codes of practice for the underground storage of petroleum 
products which included a schedule for upgrading or replacing unprotected tanks.
10  While the 
Codes of Practice are not binding they are intended to guide provincial regulations and “the 
CCME advocates that the recommendations … be adopted by the various provincial and 
territorial regulatory authorities as minimum requirements” (CCME 1993).   
Table 1 outlines the corrosion protection regulations adopted in the 10 Canadian 
Provinces.  Column 2 provides the first year in which all new tanks were required to be 
protected, with all tanks installed prior to that date being considered unprotected.
11 Column 3 
provides the date that the regulation requiring upgrading or removal of unprotected tanks was 
adopted.  Columns 4 and 5 indicate the earliest and latest upgrading and removal deadline, taking 
into account the age of tanks installed prior to the protection requirements of new installations.  
For example, the 1992 Alberta Fire Code mandates a schedule of upgrade and removal deadlines 
                                                           
9 For steel tanks, the most common form of protection is cathodic protection, which is “a method of preventing or 
reducing a metal surface by making the metal a cathode” (CCME 1993).  This can be accomplished by impressing a 
direct current or attaching sacrificial anodes.  Another option to protect from corrosion is to install fiberglass tanks. 
10 In 1991, CCREM was renames the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME).  
11 It is possible that tank owners chose to install protected tanks prior to this date.  In the province of Manitoba, only 
1% of tanks installed prior to when protection became required while 99% installed after were protected. 7 
 
which range from 2 years (1994) for tanks installed prior to 1967 to 7 years (1999) for tanks 
installed after 1988.  However, if all tanks installed after 1984 contain corrosion protection, the 
last relevant deadline is 1998.   If these regulations did influence shutdown decisions, this 
influence should be observed between the date the upgrade and removal regulations were 
adopted and the last relevant deadline. 
Table 1.  Protection, Upgrade, and Removal Regulations and Deadlines by Province 










Alberta  1984  1992  1994   1998  
British 
Columbia 
1980  None     
Manitoba  1976  2001  2003   2003  
Newfoundland  1982  None     
New 
Brunswick 
1980  1987  1989  1993  
Nova Scotia  1988  1988  1993  2003 
Ontario  1980  1988  1991  1997 
Prince Edward 
Island 
1985  1990  1990  2000 
Quebec  1984  1991  1993  1998 
Saskatchewan  1988  1992  1994  2005 
 
III.  Data 
 
Firm-level annual station counts and volumes were obtained from Kent Marketing for 1986-
2006 period for the following twelve Canadian cities: Vancouver, Edmonton, Calgary, Regina, 
Winnipeg, Toronto, Ottawa, Quebec City, St. Johns, Halifax, Charlottetown, and St. John.
12  
These data are aggregated to construct city level station counts and volumes. To calculate the 
                                                           
12 Unfortunately, Kent Marketing does not collect volume data for a small number of independent retailers. These 
independent chains were dropped when computing average station volumes but their counts are still included in our 
closure rates. As well, in a few city-year cases, we were missing volume data. In these cases, market level volume is 
interpolated as the average of the preceding and following observations 8 
 
closure rate in a city in year t, we calculate the percentage difference between the number of 
stations reported as open in January of year t and those reported as open in January of year t+1.   
Average city level annual retail price data were collected from M.J. Ervin & Associates for 
the years 1988 - 2006.
13  Wholesale gasoline prices, by market and year, were obtained for the 
period 1998-2006 from M.J. Ervin & Associates, and for the period 1989 – 1995 from the 
Bloomberg Oil Buyers’ Guide Petroleum Price Supplement.  For the 22% of observations for 
which wholesale prices were unavailable, we used fitted values based on a regression of 
wholesale prices on crude oil prices, a time trend and city effects. 
14  Finally, average residential 
property values were obtained from The Canadian Real Estate Association for all cities except 
Quebec City, which were obtained from the Quebec City Real Estate Association.
15 
Between 1986 and 2006, rationalization in the retail gasoline industry occurred in cities 
across the country.  Table 2 provides, for each city, the percentage reduction in stations from the 
year in which the maximum number of stations existed in the city (in our sample) to January, 
2006.
16 As can be seen in Table 2, the magnitude of the reduction differs across the cities, 
ranging from 19.8 percent in Calgary to 50.1 percent in Toronto. 
To capture the timing of upgrade and removal regulations, and based on the information 
presented in Table 1, we construct three regulatory dummy variables.    if 
the upgrade and removal regulation for city i was enacted in a period before or in year t but the 
                                                           
13 These data are available online at http://www.mjervin.com/index_PetroleumPrices.htm. 
14 Alternatively, we could use the crude oil price multiplied by a coefficient obtained from a regression of retail 
prices on crude oil prices. This method yielded similar results. 
15 City level property prices were unavailable for St. John’s, NFLD and Charlottetown, PEI and provincial average 
property values were used.  In both cases, the cities are expected to dominate provincial average prices. 
Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain usable commercial property prices, and are forced to assume that 
residential and commercial prices will be correlated. 
16 We use the year of the maximum number of stations for each city rather than 1986 level because many cities had 
net entry into the industry during the first few years of our sample, prior to the period of rationalization.  These years 
remain in our sample because we are interested in the pattern of station counts prior to the passing of upgrade and 
removal regulations. 9 
 
first deadline under the regulation is in year t+1 or later.   The dummy is 0 for all other years.  
if the first deadline for tanks in city i to be upgraded and removed is before or 
in year t but the last binding deadline is in year t or later.  The dummy is 0 for all other years.   
Finally, REGULATIONit=    We expect that the effect that 
upgrade and removal requirements had on closure rates shoul  d be observed when 
REGULATIONit=1.  
Table 2.  Percentage Reduction in stations from the Maximum Year to Jan.1, 2006 by City 
City  % Reduction  
Calgary  19.8 
Charlottetown  34.6 
Edmonton  30.1 
Halifax  35.6 
Ottawa  35.7 
Quebec  30.5 
Regina  29.8 
St. John  44.8 
St. John’s  32.9 
Toronto  50.1 
Vancouver  31.4 
Winnipeg  33.7 
 
Figure 1 shows the average shutdown rate across cities in our sample for each year, and also 
the number of cities for which REGULATIONit=1.   As can be seen in the average shutdown 
rates, the general trend involves little shutdown (and some growth in station counts) until the 
early 1990s, after which shutdown rates gradually tapered off. The general trend in the 
REGULATION variable is remarkably similar to that observed in shutdown rates over the sample 
– the number of cities with regulations in place but which have not yet reached their last deadline 
spikes in 1992, and then gradually tapers off. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the 
annual average rate of shutdown and the average value of REGULATIONit  is 0.66. The spike in 
closure rates in the 1992-1994 period could also reflect the effect of the recession on gasoline 10 
 
demand, property values, and interest rates.
17 
Table 3 outlines the average annual shutdown rate for years in which REGULATIONit=0, 
and  . It is often suggested that these regulations are 
more likely to cause smaller outlets to close, so we present the shutdown rates for the entire 
sample of stations as well as the annual percentage rates of decline in the number of major 
brands associated with national vertically integrated refiners.
18 The data suggests that the closure 
rate is higher in years for which the upgrade and removal regulations are in place and that the 
time period before the first deadline involves more shutdown than in the years between the first 
and last deadline.  This is not surprising given that the first deadlines usually apply to the oldest 
tanks, which are the most likely to lack protection.  Although the shutdown rate in all periods is 
larger for major brands than other stations, the effect of regulations appears smaller for these 
firms.
 19   Finally, unlike other stations, the period between the first and last deadlines involves as 
many closures  as the period leading up to the first deadline for major brands. 
Table 3.  Average Annual Shutdown Rate, 1988-2005, By Phase of Regulation 
Regulation Dummy  Number of 
Observations 
Average Shutdown Rate 
All Station Types  Major Brands 
REGULATIONit = 0  119  1.3%  2.7% 
  79  3.0%  4.5% 
  18  2.1%  4.7% 
 
   The existing literature points to a number of other possible factors influencing the 
                                                           
17 It is also possible that the publication of the CCME Codes of Practice in 1993 influenced closure rates in a number 
of provinces. 
18 According to Lederer (1989), “service station sites that do not have through-put of at least one to two million litres 
annually might find themselves no longer viable with the additional costs. The fact that large majors and regional 
refiners like Chevron were “lobbying government for more extensive regulations covering the storage of petroleum 
products” (Lederer, 1998) suggests that these regulations may have represented a n opportunity for large firms to 
force smaller independents out of the industry.   
19 Note that we do not have information on how many stations within a single firm or other subset of firms shut 
down in a given year. The percentage decline in the number of stations within a single firm or class of firms may 
also include reductions due to acquisition by other firms. 11 
 
shutdown of retail gasoline stations.  The closure rate in cities with lower profit margins is 
expected to be higher than in other cities.  We calculate the average variable profit excluding 
fixed costs in city i in year t as      is the average price of regular unleaded 
gasoline, in real dollars.
20   is the wholesale price, in real dollars.
21    is annual average 
station volume.  In support of this, the correlation coefficient between the annual average rate of 
shutdown and the annual average profit in the previous year is -0.29 for all stations and -0.22 for 
major brands, which are significantly different from 0 at the 5% and 10% levels.   
Eckert and West (2006) find evidence that market conditions and competition can 
influence closure decisions.  Initial evidence for our sample does not support a role for market 
structure. For example, the correlations between the closure rate and the concurrent or previous 
year’s three-firm concentration ratio are both 0.04 and statistically insignificant.
22   
In summary, an informal analysis of the data provides mixed evidence regarding the 
relationship between upgrade and removal regulations and city-level closure rates.  
 
IV.  Empirical Model 
 
Retail gasoline operators will choose to close a station if the expected profits from doing so 
are larger than the expected profits from remaining open.  The profits from closing a station are 
comprised of the expected revenue from reusing or selling the property as well as any costs of 
                                                           
20 Weekly average prices for each city, computed from a sample of stations surveyed each week in each city, were 
then averaged to obtain an annual average price for each city in the sample. Leaded prices are used for 1986 because 
unleaded gasoline prices are unavailable.   
21 Gasoline stations also earn profits on other products, such as tobacco products, and an important role of gasoline 
sales is in bringing customers to the station to purchase other products. Unfortunately, we lack information on how 
many stations in a market sell such other products, and to what extent. 
22 There were also a small number of significant mergers and entrants into particular markets that may have lead to 
closures, for example, ARCO’s entrance into and subsequent departure from the Vancouver market.  However, these 
events are closely associated with changes in average profitability and we do not analyze them directly. 12 
 
closure such as clean-up and remediation.  The expected profits from remaining open are the 
expected revenues from gasoline sales less the expected variable and fixed costs.
23   Therefore, 
the closure rate in city i over year t will depend on the proportion of stations in the city for which 
the expected profit from closing are higher than the expected profits from remaining open.
24 
We estimate the closure rate of city i in time period t according to the following equation  
) , 3 , , , ( 1 QFLOOR CR ER PROFIT PROPERTY f CLOSURE it it it it it  
PROPERTYit is the real average city level residential property price in thousands of dollars in 
year t and controls for city and time series variation in property values.   is real 
average per station variable profit in city i in year t-1 in millions of dollars.  ERit is a vector of 
environmental regulation variables containing , and 
REGULATIONit.  We estimate two specifications: one containing only REGULATIONit, and a 
second which includes only  .      is the three firm 
concentration ratio in city i in year t.
25  
QFLOOR is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 for Quebec City starting in 1997 and 
controls for any effect that the price floor established in Quebec in 1997 might have had on 
stations.
26  In order to control for unobserved city-level and annual variation we include city and 
                                                           
23 Many gasoline stations in Canada also house amenities such as car washes and convenience stores which may 
influence profitability.  Because we are interested in city level variation in closure rates rather than station level 
closure, we restrict the analysis to gasoline sales.   
24 An alternative approach would be to estimate the number of stations open in each city as a function of 
profitability, property values, concentration and environmental regulations to determine if the upgrade and removal 
regulations resulted in a decrease in the number of stations in affected cities.  We choose to estimate a model of the 
change in station numbers rather than the number of stations because it better answers the question we pose. 
Estimating a model in levels simply asks the question, is the number of stations lower after the environmental 
regulations.  Given that existing academic research and government studies have shown that the number of stations 
fell over our sample period, labeling the phenomenon as a period of rationalization, this question is not the goal of 
our study.  Rather, we want to know if, during this period of rationalization, the rate of closure was higher during the 
periods that stations in the cities faced upgrade and removal deadlines.  This question is best answered by estimating 
a model of closure rate. 
25 The model was also estimated using an HHI index. Qualitative conclusions were unaffected.  
26 Carranza et al. (2010) examine the effect that the Quebec price floor on the structure of markets in Quebec cities. 13 
 
year dummy variables, with Calgary and 1988 acting as our controls.
27  
Finally, we include the lagged closure rate to address autocorrelation in the errors. Including 
a lagged dependent variable with city fixed effects raises concerns regarding the consistency of 
our estimates.  A number of alternative approaches were taken to ensure robustness of our 
results, which will be discussed in Section 5.   
 
V.  Results 
 
We present the results from our two specifications in Table 4, omitting the city and year 
fixed effects.  The standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors.  Our results suggest 
that the timing of upgrade and removal regulations did influence closure rates.  The coefficients 
on all three regulation dummy variables are positive and significant at the 5% level.  For 
specification B, the hypothesis that Predeadline and Deadline are jointly equal to zero is rejected 
at the 5% level of significance while the hypothesis that their coefficients are equal cannot be 
rejected at standard significance levels.  Therefore, the results suggest that the closure rate is 
higher for provinces between the adoption of the regulation and the final deadline for upgrade or 
removal than before or after this period and that in provinces which are not in this period of 
regulation.  As well, the closure rate is higher in both the pre-deadline and between deadlines 
periods than in other years, with these two sub periods having the same effect on closure rates. 
As expected, we find that cities in which real average profits were high in the previous period 
undergo a lower rate of closure.  As well, the higher the level of concentration in the market, the 
lower is the closure rate.  To the extent that cities with higher concentration ratios have a lower 
presence of independents, this is consistent with the common assertions that independent stations 
                                                           
27 One possible source of variation is municipal bylaws which can affect the operation of retail gasoline stations.   14 
 
are more likely to exit in response to the environmental regulations and that the presence of 
independents precipitated rationalization.  We find that the price floor increased the closure rate 
in Quebec City.  Finally, we find no statistically significant effect of average property values on 
the closure rate.  This may be due to our use of residential property values as opposed to 
commercial values, or may suggest that, with the high costs of reclamation, property values are 
not a key factor in the decision to close stations. 
Table 4.  OLS Fixed Effects Results, Closure Rateit, N=216
28 
  Specification A  Specification B 




Regulation  1.37** 
(0.53) 
 
Predeadline    1.41** 
(0.64) 
Deadline    1.35** 
(0.61) 

























2  0.3724  0.3725 
 
The coefficient on the lagged closure rate is negative, consistent with the notion that the 
markets were transitioning from a state of oversaturation to an outcome with fewer stations, so 
that a high rate of closure in the previous period implies less closure is necessary in the current 
                                                           
28 *** Corresponds to significance at the 1% level.  ** Corresponds to significance at the 5% level.  * Corresponds 
to significance at the 10% level. 15 
 
period.  To ensure that the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable is not affecting our results, 
we considered a number of alternative approaches to addressing autocorrelation.  Arellano and 
Bond estimators were derived for our model with the lagged dependent variable and all 
qualitative results remained.  The model was estimated with OLS replacing the lagged dependent 
variable with city specific time trends, and all qualitative results remained.  The model was 
estimated excluding the lagged closure rate and clustering the errors by city, which allows for 
autocorrelated errors in each city.  Our qualitative results remain with the exception that, when 
errors are clustered by city, the coefficient on PROPERTY is significant at the 5% level while the 
coefficient on Predeadline is not significant at the 10% level.  However, Regulation is still 
significant at 5% and Predeadline and Deadline remain jointly significant at the 10% level.  
Finally, the OLS model with fixed effects is estimated allowing for an AR(1) process in the 
errors.  The coefficient on Regulation remains significant at 10%, but Predeadline and Deadline 
are no longer individually or jointly significant at the 10% level.  Because these approaches rely 
on large samples, which our dataset does not provide, we report the results from a simple OLS 
regression with a lagged closure rate. 
It is possible the environmental regulations are may be endogenous if provincial regulators 
take into account the effect that regulations may have on firm closures when they decide their 
environmental regulations.  For example, provinces with cities in which a large level of closure 
is expected may avoid putting in stricter environmental regulations.
29  If provinces are more 
likely to pass the regulation when they expect it to have a small impact on shutdown decisions, 
our estimated coefficient may be smaller than in the absence of such endogeneity.  Because our 
estimated coefficient is positive and significant, we are confident in the qualitative result that 
                                                           
29 It is also possible that regulators choose to provide later deadlines or to simply not enforce the deadlines in 
markets in which closure rates are expected to be high. 16 
 
closure rates were higher during the regulation period.  The concentration ratio may be 
endogenous if the pattern of closure changes the degree of concentration in the market.  Given 
that Sen and Townley (2010) find that Canadian rationalization increased market concentration, 
we expect the endogeneity to be reflected in a positive association between the closure rate and 
CR3.  Because our estimated coefficients on CR3 are uniformly negative and highly significant, 
we are confident that they are capturing the effect of concentration on closures. 
Previous literature and the informal analysis presented in the previous section suggest that 
the effect of environmental regulations may be different for major brands, regional brands, and 
independently owned stations.  Table 5 presents the results of estimating Specification A on the 
subsamples of major and non-major brands.   Our ability to analyze closure rates for the different 
station types is limited because our dataset does not differentiate between stations that leave the 
market and those that change ownership type.  For example, when the number of major brand 
stations falls over the course of a year, we cannot determine whether this station closed 
permanently or simply transferred to a non-major category.  This may explain the insignificance 
of most of the covariates in the subsample regression.
30  
For major brand stations, the coefficient on Regulation is positive and significant at the 1% 
level suggesting that the rate at which stations owned by major companies are exiting or 
transferring ownership is higher during the period of regulation than before or after.  The 
coefficient on Regulation is not significant in the non-major brand regression.  These results are 
robust to alternative specifications as described above. These findings may indicate that major 
brand stations are becoming independently owned during the period.
31  It may also be that the 
                                                           
30Specification B was also estimated on the two subsamples with no coefficients begin significant at the 10% level. 
31 One possibility is that the major brand company chooses to terminate franchise agreements with stations that pose 
a potential liability or fail to meet certain company standards and that these stations become independently owned.  
Unfortunately, data regarding the legal structure governing major brand stations is not available.     17 
 
costs of closing a station and reclaiming the land are sufficiently high that independently owned 
stations choose to remain open and perhaps fail to comply with regulations.   
 
 Table 5.  OLS Fixed Effects Results, Major and Non-Major Brands, Closure Rateit, N=216 
  Major Brands   Non-major 
Brands 







































Previous explanations for rationalization in the Canadian retail gasoline industry focus on 
what is above the ground: changes in demand and cost, the expansion of independents, and 
market concentration.  In this paper, we exploit provincial variation in UST regulations to 
examine the role that changes in these regulations may have played in the rationalization.  We 
find evidence closure rates were higher in cities and years in which stations were required to 
upgrade or remove unprotected storage tanks, suggesting that, the pattern and degree of 
rationalization in Canadian markets was influenced by environmental regulations.   
Our results are in contrast to existing studies of the role of environmental regulations on exit 18 
 
choices in other industries.  Specifically, List et al. (2004) find that environmental regulations 
had no effect on plant closures while Biorn et al. (1998) find that regulations decrease the 
probability of closure.  The difference may be that our study focuses on an industry that was 
facing other pressures to rationalize and the adoption of upgrade and removal regulations simply 
altered the pattern and degree of shutdown rather than causing closure in an otherwise healthy 
industry.  On the other hand, Yin et al. (2007) find evidence that UST regulations caused closure 
of retail stations when stations were not facing the same pressures to rationalize.  As such, the 
magnitude of compliance costs may also explain why the upgrade and removal requirements 
increased closure rates, suggesting that if compliance costs are high enough, environmental 
regulations can impact exit decisions of regulated firms.  
Our results have implications regarding the effect that environmental regulations have on 
regulated markets.  Sen and Townley (2010) find that rationalization led to increased prices and 
concentration in Canadian retail gasoline markets.  Taken together with our results, this suggests 
that the upgrade and removal regulations may have had implications for concentration and 
profits in retail gasoline markets, outcomes of importance to antitrust cases. 
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Figure 1. Annual Average Closure Rates and the Number of Cities for 
Which REGULATIONit = 1, 1986-2005
Average Closure Rate
Number of Regulated CitiesDepartment of Economics, University of Alberta 




2011-06: Physical Activity and Health Outcome: Evidence from Canada – Humphreys, 
McLeod, Ruseski 
2011-05: Dating U.S. Business Cycles with Macro Factors – Fossati 
 
2011-04: Covariate Unit Root Tests with Good Size Power – Fossati 
 
2011-03:  New measures of the costs of unemployment: Evidence from the subjective well-
being of 2.3 million Americans – Helliwell, Huang 
2011-02: Childhood Determinants of Risk Aversion: The Long Shadow of Compulsory 
Education – Hryshko, Luengo-Prado,  
2011-01: Will Biofuel Mandates Raise Food Prices? – Chakravorty, Hubert, Moreaux, 
Nostbakken 
2010-20: Does the Retirement Consumption Puzzle Differ Across the Distribution: - Fisher, 
Marchand 
2010-19: A Test of Monopoly Price Dispersion Under Demand Uncertainty – Humphreys, 
Soebbing 
2010-18: Split Incentives and Energy Efficiency in Canadian Multi-Family Dwellings – 
Maruejols, Young 
2010-17: Local Labor Market Impacts of Energy Boom-Bust-Boom in Western Canada - 
Marchand 
2010-16: House Prices and Risk Sharing – Hryshko, Luengo-Prado, Sørensen 
 
2010-15: Education vs. Optimal Taxation: The Cost of Equalizing Opportunities – Stephens 
 
2010-14: The Economic Choice of Participation and Time Spent in Physical Activity and Sport 
in Canada – Humphreys, Ruseski 
2010-13: Do Gamblers Think That Teams Tank? Evidence from the NBA – Soebbing, 
Humphreys 
2010-12: Would Hotelling Kill the Electric Car? – Chakravorty, Leach, Moreaux 
 
2010-11: Residential Land Use Regulation and the US Housing Price Cycle Between 2000 and 
2009 – Huang, Tang 
2010-10: Government Revenue Volatility in Alberta – Landon, Smith C. 
 
2010-09: Sports Participation and Happiness: Evidence from U.S. Micro Data – Huang, 
Humphreys 
2010-08: Does Financial and Goods Market Integration Matter for the External Balance? A 
Comparison of OECD Countries and Canadian Provinces – Smith, C  
2010-07: Consumption Benefits and Gambling: Evidence from the NCAA Basketball Betting 
Market – Humphreys, Paul, Weinbach 
2010-06: On Properties of Royalty and Tax Regimes in Alberta’s Oil Sands – Plourde 
 
2010-05: Prices, Point Spreads and Profits: Evidence from the National Football League - 
Humphreys 
2010-04: State-dependent congestion pricing with reference-dependent preferences - 
Lindsey 
2010-03: Nonlinear Pricing on Private Roads with Congestion and Toll Collection Costs – 
Wang, Lindsey, Yang 
Please see above working papers link for earlier papers
www.economics.ualberta.ca 